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INTRODUCTION
At the height of the recent wave of anti-sharia initiatives, the press in 
Florida declared that a Florida state court had decided to enforce “Sharia 
law.”1 One headline read, “Judge Orders use of ‘Sharia’ in Suit,’”2 with 
another article describing a Florida state court judge as having issued a 
decision “to apply Islamic law instead of state or federal statutes.”3 Instan-
taneously, Florida became the focus of a national crusade to pass laws pro-
hibiting state courts from considering “sharia law” in their decisions.4 In 
* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; Associate Director, Diane and 
Guilford Glazer Institute for Jewish Studies. I would like to thank the participants in the Sharia and 
Halakha in America Conference held at the IIT-Chicago-Kent College of Law and the University of 
Illinois at Chicago, as well as Christopher Drahozal for comments on earlier drafts of this Article. 
 1.  See, e.g., Tom Tillison, Sharia Law has come to Florida, FLA. POL. PRESS (Mar. 20, 2011, 
7:40 PM), http://www.redstate.com/diary/tomtflorida/2011/03/20/sharia-law-has-come-to-florida/ (the 
original Florida Political Press website is no longer active). 
 2.  William R. Levesque, Judge Orders Use of Islamic Law in Tampa Lawsuit Over Mosque 
Leadership, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Mar. 22, 2011, http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/civil/judge-
orders-use-of-islamic-law-in-tampa-lawsuit-over-mosque-leadership/1158818. 
 3.  Florida Judge Defends Decision to Apply Islamic Law in Tampa Case, FOX NEWS, Mar. 23, 
2011, http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/03/23/florida-judge-defends-decision-apply-islamic-law-
tampa-case/. 
 4.  See William R. Levesque, Appeals Court Won’t Stop Hillsborough Judge from Considering 
Islamic Law, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Oct. 25, 2011, http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/civil/appeals-
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fact, the extraordinary backlash against the Florida court decision even led 
the judge to issue a supplemental opinion for the sole purpose of explaining 
the original ruling in an apparent attempt to allay public fears of the sup-
posed encroachment of Sharia Law.5
In one sense, the press’s accusations about Sharia law were correct. In 
the case at the center of the media firestorm—Mansour v. Islamic Educa-
tion Center of Tampa, Inc.—a state court judge issued an order, requiring 
the case to “proceed under Ecclesiastical Islamic Law.”6 But, notwithstand-
ing some inflammatory characterizations to the contrary,7 the court did not 
issue the order because it sought to impose Islamic Law. Rather, the court’s 
decision—issued in response to an “Emergency Motion to Enforce Arbitra-
tor’s Award”8—was simply an order to enforce the arbitration agreement 
between the parties, in which they had agreed to have their dispute resolved 
in accordance with Islamic Law.9 For the court to enforce the arbitrator’s 
award, it had to assure that the arbitration proceedings conformed to the 
rules adopted by the parties in their arbitration agreement—in this case 
Islamic procedural rules.10
While Mansour received public scrutiny for all the wrong reasons, the 
case does raise some important questions, not only about judicial oversight 
of religious arbitration, but also about how the U.S. legal system conceptu-
alizes religious law. Indeed, Mansour is not the only case where courts 
have been tasked with resolving procedural challenges to religious arbitra-
tion awards.11
For example, recent litigation between the Church of Scientology and 
some former members similarly hinged on whether the arbitration agree-
original decision, the political atmosphere was already charged with debate that Islamic law had gained 
a toehold in U.S. courts.”). 
 5.  Mansour v. Islamic Educ. Ctr. of Tampa, Inc., No. 08-CA-3497 (Fla Cir. Ct. Mar. 22, 2011) 
(“The purpose of this opinion is to discuss the facts, procedural history and analysis relating to the 
court’s ‘Order in Connection with Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion to Enforce Arbitrator’s Award’ dated 
March 3, 2011.”). 
 6.  Order in Connection with Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion to Enforce Arbitrator’s Award at 1, 
Mansour v. Islamic Educ. Ctr. of Tampa, Inc., No. 08-CA-3497 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 3, 2011). 
 7.  For an extreme example, see Florida Judge Orders Muslims to Follow Sharia Law, Against 
Their Will, CREEPING SHARIA (Mar. 9, 2011), http://creepingsharia.wordpress.com/2011/03/19/florida-
judge-orders-muslims-to-follow-sharia-law-against-their-will/. 
 8.  Order, supra note 6. 
 9.  Mansour, No. 08-CA-3497, at 4. 
 10.  Id. at 3. 
 11.  See, e.g., Kahan v. Rosner, 889 N.Y.S. 2d 839, 842–43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (vacating a 
rabbinical arbitration award on the grounds that one of the parties was not granted the right to his 
attorney of choice); Beth Jacob Teachers Seminary, Inc. v. Le’Bunos, No. 12218/08, 2009 WL 782549, 
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ment complies with required procedural standards.12 The agreement at issue 
required all disputes between the Church of Scientology and its members to 
be arbitrated by church members “in good standing with the Mother 
Church.”13 Not surprisingly, the plaintiffs suing the Church of Scientology 
claimed that such a proceeding is inherently biased, rendering the agree-
ment void.14
In such cases, courts are thrust into a complex role. Parties submit dis-
putes to religious arbitration tribunals for resolution in accordance with 
religious law.15 While courts cannot review a tribunal’s application of reli-
gious law, they have no need for such inquiries in the context of reviewing 
religious arbitration awards. Like any other arbitration award, courts do not 
review the substantive merits of the award, deferring instead to the judg-
ment of the religious arbitration tribunal as a matter of arbitration doc-
trine.16
However, courts are required to review the process of arbitration to 
ensure compliance both with the procedures adopted by the parties in their 
agreement17 and various mandatory statutory requirements.18 This review 
 12.  See Order, Schippers v. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., No. 11-11250-CI-21 (Fla. Cir. 
Ct. Mar. 7, 2012). 
 13.  Appellant’s Initial Brief at 2–3, Schippers v. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc., No. 
2D12-1995 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. May 18, 2012). 
 14.  Id. at 13–14.
 15.  See, for example, the Standard Binding Arbitration Agreement provided by the Beth Din of 
America, which is available at Forms and Publications, BETH DIN OF AMERICA,
http://bethdin.org/forms-publications.asp (last visited Nov. 30, 2014) (“The parties acknowledge that 
the arbitrators may resolve this controversy in accordance with Jewish law (din) or through court or-
dered settlement in accordance with Jewish law (p’shara krova l’din)), and the Agreement to Media-
tion/Arbitration provided by the Chicago Rabbinical Council, which is available at Din Torah-Halachic 
Arbitration, CHI. RABBINICAL COUNCIL,
http://www.crcweb.org/AGREEMENT%20TO%20MEDIATION.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2014) (“The 
parties acknowledge that the arbitrator(s) may resolve this controversy in accordance with Jewish law 
(din) and/or the general principles of arbitration and equity customarily employed by the Chicago 
Rabbinical Council.”). 
 16.  See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 563 (1976) (“[Courts] should 
not undertake to review the merits of arbitration awards but should defer to the tribunal chosen by the 
parties finally to settle their disputes.”); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 
U.S. 593, 596 (1960) (“The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper 
approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements.”). 
 17.  See, e.g., J. P. Greathouse Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Blount Bros. Constr. Co., 374 F.2d 324, 325 
(D.C. Cir. 1967) (vacating arbitration award where issues in the arbitration included questions of law 
despite the parties’ agreement limiting the arbitration to questions of fact only); Prudential Sec., Inc. v. 
Dalton, 929 F. Supp. 1411, 1414–18 (N.D. Okla. 1996) (vacating an arbitration award where the arbi-
trator had denied the parties a hearing guaranteed to them by their agreement).  
 18.  See, e.g., Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (West 2009 & Supp. 2014) (providing 
grounds for vacatur of arbitration awards under federal law); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7506 (McKinney 2013) 
(providing limited procedural requirements for arbitration); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511 (McKinney 2013) 
(providing grounds for vacatur under New York law); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 4 (2000) (detailing 
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ensures that the arbitration proceedings meet the contractual expectations 
of the parties and adhere to the legally mandated procedural standards. 
Failure to comply with such standards can serve as grounds for vacating the 
arbitration award.19
Courts face a number of challenges when evaluating motions seeking 
to vacate religious arbitration awards on procedural grounds. The core 
problem is that religious arbitration agreements require religious tribunals 
to resolve disputes not only in accordance with religious substantive law, 
but also in accordance with religious procedural rules.20 Thus, when courts 
address claims that religious tribunals failed to follow the contractually 
required procedural rules, they are often thrust into debates over the appli-
cation and enforcement of religious doctrine. This leads to two types of 
problems. 
First, resolving procedural challenges to religious arbitration awards 
often requires defining grounds for vacatur in light of the specific rules and 
principles of the contractually incorporated body of religious law. For ex-
ample, the religious procedural rules of a particular religious arbitration 
system—and the parties submitting a dispute for resolution in accordance 
with those rules—may have different definitions of key statutory terms that 
figure into vacatur analysis.21 As in the example discussed at length be-
low,22 arbitrators may not exclude evidence that is “pertinent” or “materi-
al.”23 But the very definition of what evidence is pertinent and material 
may be circumscribed by the rules of evidence employed by the procedural 
rules of a particular religious legal system.24
Second, judicial review of religious arbitration procedure frequently 
forces courts to confront questions of religious doctrine and practice—
questions that courts are generally understood as being constitutionally 
prohibited from resolving.25 As a result, this “religious question doctrine” 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  See for example, the Rules and Procedures provided by the Beth Din of America, which are 
available at Rules and Procedures, BETH DIN OF AMERICA, http://bethdin.org/docs/PDF2-
Rules_and_Procedures.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2014) (“These Rules of Procedure are designed to 
provide for a process of dispute resolution in a Beth Din which is in consonance with the demands of 
Jewish law that one diligently pursue justice, while also recognizing the values of peace and compro-
mise.”). 
 21.  See Federal Arbitration Act § 10. 
 22.  See infra Part I. 
 23.  See Federal Arbitration Act § 10(a)(3). 
 24.  See infra pp. 146–52. 
 25.  See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976) (“[W]here 
resolution of the disputes cannot be made without extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law 
and polity, the First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the deci-
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prevents courts from evaluating whether religious arbitration tribunals 
complied with various procedural rules, thereby undermining the ability of 
courts to evaluate whether religious arbitration awards met the contractual 
expectations of the parties as well as the legally mandated rules that ensure 
the fairness of the proceedings. 
These two related worries not only raise important questions about ju-
dicial review of procedural challenges to religious arbitration awards, but 
they also bring into focus broader questions as to the way in which U.S. 
law conceptualizes and engages religious law. Indeed, the inherent com-
plexities encountered by courts when evaluating religious procedural chal-
lenges are emblematic of the hybridity of religious law, which is 
simultaneously viewed by U.S. law as both a form of law and a type of 
religion. Thus, from one perspective, religious law functions like other 
forms of law, susceptible to incorporation via choice-of-law provisions in a 
variety of commercial settings. On the other hand, constitutional doctrine 
continues to subsume religious law within the larger framework of religion, 
thereby preventing courts from resolving claims that turn on questions of 
religious legal doctrine. In this way, religious law stands between law and 
religion, complicating the ability of co-religionists to enter agreements and 
resolve disputes in accordance with mutually shared religious principles. 
As an example of this dynamic, this Article applies arbitration and 
constitutional doctrine to a paradigmatic procedural challenge to a religious 
arbitration award: failure to admit testimony on the ground that the witness 
is female.26 While such a practice appears to be rare in contemporary reli-
gious arbitration,27 it serves as an important case study that highlights the 
twin obstacles to judicial review of procedural challenges to religious arbi-
tian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1576 (1st Cir. 1989) (“[C]ivil courts cannot adjudicate 
disputes turning on church policy and administration or on religious doctrine and practice.”); Burgess v. 
Rock Creek Baptist Church, 734 F. Supp. 30, 31 (D.D.C. 1990) (stating that court should not adjudicate 
a dispute that requires resolving an “underlying controversy over religious doctrine or practice”); see 
also Lang v. Levi, 16 A.3d 980, 989 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (“The Supreme Court has held that both 
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment prohibit judicial review of reli-
gious questions.”); Elmora Hebrew Ctr., Inc. v. Fishman, 593 A.2d 725, 730 (N.J. 1991). 
 26.  The focus in this article will be on instances where a rabbinical court applies Jewish law’s 
rule prohibiting female testimony. See generally Shimshon Ettinger, Testimonial Competence of Women 
in Civil Matters under Jewish Law, 21 DINEI ISRAEL 241 (2000). However, on some accounts, Islamic 
Law discounts the evidentiary value of female testimony as well. See Mohammad Fadel, Two Women, 
One Man: Knowledge, Power, and Gender in Medieval Sunni Legal Thought, 29 INT’L J. MIDDLE EAST 
STUD. 185 (1997) (discussing various approaches to the testimony of women in Islamic jurisprudence). 
 27.  See Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Women, Religion and Multiculturalism in Israel, 5 UCLA J.
INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 339, 356 (2000) (noting that, while as a formal matter women cannot serve as 
witnesses under Jewish law, “rabbinical courts routinely accept women’s testimony and practically 
accord it the same evidentiary weight that is accorded to men’s testimony”). For a discussion of the 
various exceptions to the formal rule, see 1 EMMANUEL QUINT, A RESTATEMENT OF RABBINIC CIVIL 
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tration. In this context, courts are called upon to interpret arbitral procedur-
al requirements on the basis of the legal rules imposed by religious law; 
and yet, at the same time, courts are instructed to avoid any interrogation or 
interpretation of those legal rules because resolving such religious ques-
tions stands beyond their constitutionally circumscribed jurisdiction. 
In response to this conundrum, this Article briefly considers three ap-
proaches to navigating the relationship between U.S. law and religious law: 
(1) rejection, (2) deference/autonomy, and (3) de-mystification. In so do-
ing, this Article advances a modest argument in favor of de-mystifying 
religious law to conceptualize it as more like law than religion. This ap-
proach opens the possibility that courts can better enforce contractually 
selected forms of religious law to ensure that judicial outcomes more ade-
quately protect parties to religious agreements from various forms of mis-
conduct. 
This Article proceeds in two parts. Part I describes how courts ought 
to address a challenge to a religious arbitration award that is predicated on 
the failure of a rabbinic court to admit female testimony. In so doing, this 
Article will consider the way current arbitration and constitutional doctrine 
combine to require courts to treat religious law as both law and religion, 
thereby insulating religious arbitration awards from various forms of judi-
cial review. Part II builds upon the particular case of such religious proce-
dural challenges, considering the various ways U.S. law might interact with 
religious law, and arguing that U.S. law should de-mystify religious law by 
treating it more like law than religion. 
I. ANATOMY OF A CASE
Consider the following case: Two parties submit a dispute for arbitra-
tion before a rabbinical arbitration tribunal. Like many religious arbitration 
agreements,28 the parties’ arbitration agreement is signed post-dispute out 
of the parties’ shared desire to have their dispute resolved by religious au-
thorities and in accordance with religious law.29 The arbitration agreement, 
like many boilerplate rabbinical arbitration agreements, includes a choice-
of-law provision, which requires the arbitrators to resolve the dispute in 
accordance with Jewish Law.30
 28.  Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Con-
flicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1301 (2011). 
 29.  Id. at 1243–52. 
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During the proceedings, Party A calls its star witness to the stand—a 
witness who happens to be female. Over strenuous objections, the arbitra-
tors inform Party A that according to their interpretation of Jewish Law, the 
female witness’s testimony cannot be admitted into evidence. At the end of 
the proceedings, the arbitrators find in favor of Party B, awarding Party B 
some sum of money. Party A believes that the arbitration award should be 
invalidated because the arbitrators failed to consider the testimony of his 
female witness. Does Party A have any legal grounds to assert such a claim 
in court? 
Resolving such a claim requires asking two related questions. First, 
how should courts treat religious procedural rules for the purpose of enforc-
ing arbitration agreements? Second, to what extent can courts evaluate the 
application of religious procedural rules by religious arbitration tribunals? 
As discussed below, answering these questions tests to what extent we 
believe courts should see religious law as simultaneously law and religion. 
A. Religious Law as Law 
One response to the above hypothetical fact-pattern might be to argue 
that Party A could seek to have a court vacate the arbitration award on the 
ground that the arbitrators “refus[ed] to hear evidence pertinent and materi-
al to the controversy.”31 Courts apply this statutory ground for vacatur 
where the “arbitrator’s refusal to hear pertinent and material evidence prej-
udiced the rights of the parties to the arbitration proceedings”32 and thereby 
“deprive[d] a party to the proceeding of a fundamentally fair hearing.”33 In 
our hypothetical case, there may be good reason to believe that the arbitra-
tor’s refusal to admit the female witness’s testimony prejudiced Party A’s 
rights. Although instances where religious arbitration tribunals refuse to 
admit female testimony are rare,34 the typical reaction of attorneys35 in such 
 31.  See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(3) (West 2009 & Supp. 2014). Examples of 
courts employing this standard to invalidate an arbitration award include Cofinco, Inc. v. Bakrie & 
Bros., N. V., 395 F. Supp. 613, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) and Teamsters, Local Union No. 506 v. E.D. Clapp 
Corp., 551 F. Supp. 570, 577–78 (N.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 32.  Aviles v. Charles Schwab & Co., No. 10-12216, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14846, at *7 (11th 
Cir. July 20, 2011); see, e.g., Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 263 F. Supp. 488, 
493 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (granting vacatur on the grounds that pertinent and material evidence had been 
improperly withheld from the arbitrator, when he excluded an eyewitness); see also Rosensweig v. 
Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 494 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir. 2007) (“‘A federal court may vacate an 
arbitrator’s award only if the arbitrator’s refusal to hear pertinent and material evidence prejudices the 
rights of the parties to the arbitration proceedings.’”) (quoting Hoteles Condado Beach, La Concha & 
Convention Ctr. v. Union De Tronquistas Local 901, 763 F.2d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 1985)). 
 33.  Three S. Delaware, Inc. v. DataQuick Info. Sys., Inc., 492 F.3d 520, 531 (4th Cir. 2007). 
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cases is that subsequent arbitration awards predicated on such refusals are 
subject to vacatur under the “material and pertinent evidence” standard. 
However, applying such a ground for vacatur would be a mistake. 
Consider the following alternative hypothetical fact-pattern. Imagine an 
arbitration agreement that contains a provision stating that the rules of evi-
dence of a particular foreign country shall apply to the arbitration. Now 
imagine that the rules of evidence in the country prohibit the admission of 
video evidence on the grounds that such evidence is highly susceptible to 
manipulation or fabrication.36 Under such circumstances, were a party to 
present video evidence to the arbitration tribunal, we would expect the 
tribunal to refuse to admit the evidence in accordance with the agreed upon 
evidentiary rules.37 And, as a corollary, a court should not vacate an award 
issued by the tribunal because it failed to admit “material and pertinent 
evidence.” The mutually agreed upon rules of evidence render the video 
evidence “immaterial.”38
This would seem to be the right framework for evaluating similar 
claims in the context of religious arbitration. Religious arbitration agree-
ments generally incorporate choice-of-law provisions that require the tribu-
 35.  In my experience, this has been the first reaction of lawyers considering how to attack deci-
sions based on the application of religious rules to exclude important testimony. 
 36.  Foreign rules of evidence may vary widely from the rules of evidence in the United States. 
See, e.g., EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES 1705 (2d ed. 
2009) (“As a general rule, French courts do not recognize exclusionary rules of evidence.”); Renee 
Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems: An American on Trial for an American Murder in the 
French Cour D’Assises, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 791, 831 (“There are virtually no U.S.-style rules of 
evidence in a French trial. All sorts of evidence comes in, including hearsay.”); John E.B. Myers, A
Decade of International Legal Reform Regarding Child Abuse Investigation and Litigation: Steps 
toward a Child Witness Code, 28 PAC. L.J. 169, 204 (1996) (“‘There is . . . no authority for the proposi-
tion that a constitutional right of physical confrontation’ exists in Ireland.”). 
 37.  See Halim v. Great Gatsby’s Auction Gallery, Inc., 516 F.3d 557, 564 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Ignor-
ing a choice of law provision in an arbitration agreement exceeds the arbitrator’s power since the arbi-
trator’s power is borne from that arbitration agreement.”); see also AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011) (“Parties could agree to arbitrate pursuant to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, or pursuant to a discovery process rivaling that in litigation. Arbitration is a 
matter of contract, and the FAA requires courts to honor parties’ expectations.”) (emphasis in original); 
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681 (2010) (citing Volt Info. Sciences, 
Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)) (reaffirming that arbitration agreements are enforced 
according to their terms); Southwire Co. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n., 545 S.E.2d 681, 684 (Ga. App. 
2001) (“the arbitrator may not ignore the plain language of the parties’ contract.”). 
 38.  See, e.g., Professional Staff Congress/City Univ. of N.Y. v. Bd. of Higher Ed. of N.Y., 347 
N.E.2d 918, 920 (N.Y. 1976) (refusing to grant vacatur where an arbitrator did not hear material evi-
dence excluded by the agreement itself, since parties may determine for themselves the scope of evi-
dence admissible in arbitration through their agreement); Paul M. Cotloff et al., Annotation, Refusal of 
Arbitrators to Receive Evidence, or to Permit Briefs or Arguments, on Particular Issues as Grounds for 
Relief From Award, 75 A.L.R.3d 132 (2014) (“[P]arties may, by their agreement to arbitrate, broaden or 
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nal to apply a particular set of religious procedural rules.39 This incorpo-
rated choice-of-law provision is key to the arbitration agreement because it 
ensures that the dispute is resolved in accordance with shared religious 
rules and values—one of the primary motivations behind parties submitting 
disputes for religious arbitration.40 Accordingly, where religious eviden-
tiary rules require deeming particular evidence inadmissible, such evidence 
should be deemed “immaterial” under the terms of the arbitration agree-
ment. Indeed, some courts have noted that an arbitration tribunal’s failure 
to hear testimony serves as a ground for vacatur only where the failure 
amounts to “misconduct.”41 A religious tribunal’s good-faith application of 
the parties’ selected religious law to exclude evidence would hardly seem 
to qualify as misconduct. 
To be sure, there might still be reasons why the application of such re-
ligious evidentiary rules would render the arbitration agreement unenforce-
able. One option in such cases is to rely on the public policy exception to 
vacate awards.42 The challenge here is that courts apply the public policy 
exception to the enforcement of arbitration awards in extremely limited 
circumstances.43 Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that attempts to va-
cate an arbitration award on the grounds of public policy must demonstrate 
that the arbitration award “run[s] contrary to an explicit, well-defined, and 
dominant public policy, as ascertained by reference to positive law and not 
from general considerations of supposed public interests.”44
 39.  See, for example, the Standard Binding Arbitration Agreement provided by the Beth Din of 
America, which is available at Forms and Publications, Supra note 15 (providing that the dispute 
between the parties shall be resolved in accordance with the Beth Din of America’s Rules and Proce-
dures, and stating that “[t]he parties acknowledge that the arbitrators may resolve this controversy in 
accordance with Jewish law (din) or through court ordered settlement in accordance with Jewish law 
(p’shara krova l’din)), and the Rules and Procedures provided by the Beth Din of America, which are 
available at Rules and Procedures, supra note 20 (“These Rules of Procedure are designed to provide 
for a process of dispute resolution in a Beth Din which are in consonance with the demands of Jewish 
law that one diligently pursue justice, while also recognizing the values of peace and compromise.”). 
 40.  See generally Helfand, supra note 28. 
 41.  Century Indem. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 584 F.3d 513, 557 (3d Cir. 
2009) (emphasizing that not every failure to hear pertinent and material evidence constitutes miscon-
duct).
 42.  For my views on applying the public policy in the context of religious arbitration, see 
Helfand, supra note 28, at 1288–94.  
 43.  See, e.g., David M. Glanstein, A Hail Mary Pass: Public Policy Review of Arbitration 
Awards, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 302 (2001) (“Vacatur of a labor arbitration award on 
public policy grounds is very unlikely given the narrow scope of this exception in post Misco jurispru-
dence. It is even less likely when courts review commercial arbitration awards.”). 
 44.  S.E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 531 U.S. 57, 63 (2000); see also
Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n. of N.Y., 625 F.2d 38, 42 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(“[A]rbitral awards may be judicially vacated on such grounds as . . . public policy . . . .”); Dep’t of 
Cent. Mgmt. Servs. v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. (AFSCME), 614 N.E.2d 513, 519–20 
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There are, of course, state and federal statutes45—along with constitu-
tional provisions46—that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex, which 
might bolster a court’s decision to vacate an award where the panel refused 
to admit testimony because the witness was female. But there are still some 
significant hurdles to employing the public policy exception in this context. 
To vacate an award on public policy grounds, courts often require that the 
public policy violation appear on the “face” of the award,47 and a tribunal’s 
refusal to admit female testimony would be unlikely to satisfy rigorous 
enforcement of this standard.48 Moreover, to the extent courts focus nar-
rowly on the “positive law” requirement49—that is, the “strong and well-
defined” policy “embodied in constitutional, statutory[,] or common 
law”50—it may be difficult to invoke the public policy exception, given that 
there is no specific positive law that prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
sex when admitting testimony before arbitrators. Furthermore, asserting the 
public policy exception to vacate such an arbitration award has become 
even more difficult in light of the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Hall 
where the award reinstated an investigator who had been discharged for falsifying information about 
child abuse in his investigation report).  
 45.  See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (prohibit-
ing discrimination based on sex in the context of employment). State statutes prohibiting sex discrimi-
nation include statutes addressing such discrimination in the context of employment and public 
accommodations. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 2014) (prohibiting discrimination based 
on sex in the employment and public accommodations contexts). See generally Alan J. Hoff, Note, A
Proposed Analysis for Gender-Based Practices and State Public Accommodations Laws, 16 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 135 (1982). 
 46.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (Equal Protection Clause); see also Craig v. Boren, 
429 U.S. 190 (1976) (adopting intermediate scrutiny for evaluating sex-based classifications). 
 47.  See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of New York v. Hershkowitz, 764 N.Y.S.2d 254, 256 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2003) (“To invoke the [public policy] exception, the court must be able to examine an arbitration 
agreement or an award on its face, and conclude that public policy considerations, embodied in either 
statute or decisional law, prohibit (1) arbitration of the particular matters to be decided, or (2) certain 
relief being granted.”). 
 48.  To be sure, New York courts have indicated a willingness to go beyond the “face” of the 
award so long as they would not have to engage in “extended fact-finding,” leaving the possibility open 
that a court may be willing to apply the public policy exception after limited inquiry into whether a 
witness was prohibited from testifying because she was female. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith 
Inc. v. Savino, No. 06 Civ. 868 (LAP), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23126, at *48 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2007) 
(quoting Cohoes Police Officers Union, Local 756 ex rel. Westfall v. City of Cohoes, 692 N.Y.S.2d 
796, 798 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)) (“[B]efore a court may intervene 
with an arbitration award on policy grounds, it must be able to examine an arbitration agreement or an 
award on its face, without engaging in extended fact-finding or legal analysis, and conclude that public 
policy precludes its enforcement.”). 
 49.  See supra note 44. 
 50.  New York State Corr. Officers & Police Benevolent Ass’n., Inc. v. State, 726 N.E.2d 462, 
466 (1999); see also W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983) (“Such a public 
policy, however, must be well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained ‘by reference to the laws 
and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.’”) (quoting 
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Street Associates v. Mattel, where the Court held that the grounds for vaca-
tur listed in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) are exclusive.51 This has led 
some federal courts to question whether public policy—a ground not listed 
in the FAA—remains a valid basis for vacating an arbitration award at all.52
Now none of these individual worries about applying the public policy 
exception to cases where an arbitration tribunal refuses to admit female 
testimony is decisive; but collectively they do offer good reason to be skep-
tical as to whether the public policy exception has the doctrinal wherewith-
al to provide courts with grounds to vacate awards in cases where the arbi-
arbitrator refuses to admit female testimony.53 Therefore, there seems to be 
good reason to think that the application of religious evidentiary rules to 
exclude female testimony would not typically subject a subsequent arbitra-
tion award to vacatur. While somewhat counterintuitive, this conclusion is 
noteworthy because it exemplifies how, in some circumstances, religious 
law is treated like any other form of law. Religious law can provide parties 
to a dispute with evidentiary rules that circumscribe the scope of material 
and pertinent evidence. The fact that a tribunal applies religious law to 
exclude evidence—as opposed to some other non-religious body of law—
should not authorize a court to deem that evidence “pertinent and material,” 
and thereby empower the court to vacate the award. 
The intuition that the “pertinent and material” ground for vacatur 
should apply in these cases appears to be predicated on the view that reli-
gious evidentiary rules—especially when based on gender-biased crite-
ria54—cannot provide sufficient justification for excluding evidence 
because they fail to explain why the evidence is not probative of the dispute 
between the parties. But the underlying rationale for the evidentiary rule 
excluding female witnesses does not provide a basis for treating it differ-
ently than any other mutually agreed upon rules of evidence. Parties have 
 51.  Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008) (“We now hold that §§ 10 
and 11 respectively provide the FAA’s exclusive grounds for expedited vacatur and modification.”). 
 52.  Compare, Rogers v. KBR Tech. Servs., Inc., No. 08-20036, 2008 WL 2337184, at *2 (5th 
Cir. June 9, 2008) (stating that Hall Street Associates “calls into doubt the non-statutory grounds [for 
vacatur]”) with Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1283, 1290 (9th Cir. 
2009) (holding that Hall Street Associates did not foreclose either the manifest disregard of the law 
or public policy grounds for vacating an arbitration award). The Supreme Court itself has explicitly 
declined to clarify its position. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 689 n.3 
(2010). 
 53.  I have elsewhere proposed that unconscionability might also provide a basis in some cases for 
avoiding awards where the arbitrators have refused to admit female testimony by allowing the parties to 
challenge the validity of the agreement. See Helfand, supra note 28, at 1294–1303. Of course, to retro-
actively attack the validity of an arbitration agreement after commencement of the arbitration proceed-
ings requires addressing difficult questions of waiver. See id. at 1301–03.
 54.  See Ettinger, supra note 26, at 245–50 (discussing the origin of and rationale behind Jewish 
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the undeniable autonomy to specify rules of evidence to govern the adjudi-
cation of their dispute.55 Thus, where parties adopt a set of religious rules to 
govern arbitration proceedings, those rules must be given effect unless 
some other ground for vacatur applies. Neither arbitration doctrine nor 
constitutional doctrine56 empowers courts to single out religious law for 
different status when it comes to applying the statutory grounds for vacat-
ing arbitration awards. The origin of, or rationale behind, religious law 
does not alter the equation. Religious law must be placed on par with any 
other law the parties choose. Religious law, from this vantage point, must 
be treated as law. 
B. Religious Law as Religion 
While the application of religious evidentiary rules might demonstrate 
how religious law is treated as law, it is only half the story. It is true that 
where parties have incorporated religious procedural law into their arbitra-
tion agreement, courts should not vacate awards premised on the applica-
tion of such religious evidentiary rules. However, parties often disagree 
about what it is that religious procedural rules require. Consider our female 
witness hypothetical again; there is significant dispute over whether and to 
what extent Jewish law prohibits a rabbinical tribunal from refusing to hear 
female testimony.57 Indeed, the current trend is to allow the evidence to be 
admitted for consideration by the rabbinical tribunal.58 As a result, if a rab-
binical tribunal refused to allow testimony because the witness was female, 
the party presenting the testimony would likely challenge the ruling on 
religious grounds. 
Moreover, not only would the party likely raise this objection during 
the arbitration, but it would also raise the objection in a motion to vacate 
the award. Thus, the challenge to the award would not simply be based on a 
generic refusal to admit “pertinent and material evidence,” but on a claim 
that the misapplication of religious rules led the tribunal to refuse to admit 
“pertinent and material evidence.” Put differently, the failure of the tribunal 
 55.  Cf. AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011) (“Parties could agree 
to arbitrate pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or pursuant to a discovery process rivaling 
that in litigation. Arbitration is a matter of contract, and the FAA requires courts to honor parties’ 
expectations.”) (emphasis in original). 
 56.  Cf. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (holding that 
the Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from singling out religion for worse treatment). 
 57.  See QUINT, supra note 27, at 290; Ettinger, supra note 26.  
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to hear the pertinent and material evidence stems from the fact that the 
tribunal incorrectly interpreted the relevant religious legal rules.59
If such an objection came up in the context of some other body of 
law—for example, a choice of law provision incorporating the law of a 
particular country—then a court would presumably apply the FAA’s statu-
tory grounds for vacatur to determine whether misapplication of the chosen 
law provided grounds for refusing to enforce the award.60 Thus, to use our 
previous hypothetical regarding video testimony, if an arbitrator interpreted 
the rules of evidence of the selected legal system as excluding video testi-
mony, a party disputing that interpretation might later look to the statutory 
grounds for vacatur in order to challenge the arbitration award. 
Most notably, while an arbitrator would be afforded wide deference in 
such matters,61 a party might still raise a challenge to the arbitrator’s inter-
pretation of the rules of evidence incorporated via the choice-of-law provi-
sion under the “manifest disregard of the law” standard.62 Under this 
standard, a court can vacate an award where the arbitrator ignored govern-
ing law that “‘was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable,’ and ‘the 
arbitrator knew about the existence of a clearly governing legal principle 
but decided to ignore it.’”63 To apply the manifest disregard of the law 
 59.  See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (West 2009 & Supp. 2014) (providing the statutory 
grounds for vacatur under the Federal Arbitration Act). 
 60.  Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008). 
 61.  Giller v. Oracle USA, Inc., 512 F. App’x 71, 73 (2d Cir. 2013) (describing the “exceedingly 
heavy burden” that a party must satisfy to have an award vacated under the manifest disregard of the 
law standard). 
 62.  See, e.g., Kashner Davidson Sec. Corp. v. Mscisz, 531 F.3d 68, 70–71 (1st Cir. 2008); Nat’l 
Ass’n. of Gov’t Emps., Local R1-200 v. City of Bridgeport, 912 A.2d 539, 542 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007) 
(“[A]n award that manifests an egregious or patently irrational application of the law is an award that 
should be set aside pursuant to § 52-418(a)(4) because the arbitrator has exceeded [his] powers or so 
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted 
was not made. We emphasize, however, that the manifest disregard of the law ground for vacating an 
arbitration award is narrow and should be reserved for circumstances of an arbitrator’s extraordinary 
lack of fidelity to established legal principles.”). 
 63.  NGC Network Asia, L.L.C. v. PAC Pac. Group Int’l, Inc., 511 F. App’x 86, 89 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(quoting Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 121 n.1 (2d Cir. 2011)); see also Lagstein v. 
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 607 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2010) (“‘Manifest disregard of 
the law’ means something more than just an error in the law or a failure on the part of the arbitrators to 
understand or apply the law.”) (quoting Michigan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 826, 
832 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
Although the Supreme Court did question the viability of the “manifest disregard of the law” 
standard in Hall Street Associates, most federal courts of appeals continue to apply the standard as a 
more limited application of the statutory ground for vacatur that prohibits arbitrators from “exceed[ing] 
their powers.” Federal Arbitration Act § 10. See Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 
1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the “manifest disregard” standard falls within the statutory 
grounds, “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers” as set forth by the FAA); Coffee Beanery, Ltd. 
v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App’x 415, 418 (6th Cir. 2008) (stating that in addition to the statutory grounds 
outlined in the FAA, courts may vacate arbitration awards if they are “found to be in manifest disregard 
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standard, a court must first determine precisely what the mutually selected 
law required, and then determine whether the arbitrator knowingly ignored 
the law.64
Satisfying the manifest disregard of the law standard in this context is 
difficult, given that arbitration awards cannot be vacated for an error of 
law.65 Thus, an erroneous application of evidentiary rules would only serve 
as a ground for vacatur if the party challenging the award could prove that 
the rules of evidence were intentionally misapplied, notwithstanding the 
arbitrator’s knowledge of the law.66 However, the manifest disregard of the 
law standard still allows courts to police arbitrators who choose to ignore 
mutually agreed upon choice-of-law provisions by evaluating what precise-
ly the selected body of law requires in a given circumstance and then com-
paring that requirement with the decision of the arbitrator. To use our video 
evidence hypothetical, a court would determine what the selected body of 
law required regarding the admission of video evidence, and then compare 
ing three components of the “manifest disregard” standard), rev’d on other grounds, 559 U.S. 662 
(2010). But see Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that 
manifest disregard is no longer a valid ground for vacatur post-Hall Street); Ramos-Santiago v. United 
Parcel Serv., 524 F.3d 120, 124 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008) (describing the Supreme Court as having held in 
Hall Street “that manifest disregard of the law is not a valid ground for vacating or modifying an arbi-
tral award in cases brought under the Federal Arbitration Act”). 
 64.  See, e.g., Kashner Davidson, 531 F.3d at 70–71 (reversing the district court’s confirmation of 
an arbitration award after finding the “[arbitration p]anel manifestly disregarded the law by dismissing 
appellants’ counterclaims and third-party claims as a sanction in contravention of the explicit terms of 
the [NASD] Code . . . .”); Metro. Waste Control Comm’n v. City of Minnetonka, 242 N.W.2d 830, 
832–33 (Minn. 1976) (vacating award because the panel was aware that the agreement limited the 
arbitration to interpreting and implementing the Service Availability Charge (SAC) rules, and instead 
“impose[d] their own notions of equity.”); cf. Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v. Dist. 2 Marine Eng’rs 
Beneficial Ass’n, 889 F.2d 599, 604 (5th Cir. 1989) (affirming vacatur on grounds that “arbitral action 
contrary to express contractual provisions will not be respected.”); Tootsie Roll Indus., Inc. v. Local 
Union No. 1, Bakery, Confectionery & Tobacco Workers’ Int’l Union, 832 F.2d 81, 84 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(affirming vacatur, stating, “[w]hile reliance on [past practices of the parties] is appropriate to interpret 
ambiguous contract terms, such as the definition of “month” and the duration of the probationary period 
in the case at hand, [past practices of the parties] cannot be relied upon to modify clear and unambigu-
ous provisions.”). 
 65.  See George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 579 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he 
question for decision by a federal court asked to set aside an arbitration award . . . is not whether the 
arbitrator or arbitrators erred in interpreting the contract; it is not whether they clearly erred in interpret-
ing the contract; it is not whether they grossly erred in interpreting the contract; it is whether they 
interpreted the contract.”) (quoting Hill v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 814 F.2d 1192, 1194–95 (7th Cir. 
1987)). 
 66.  See Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[M]anifest disregard 
will be found where an ‘arbitrator understood and correctly stated the law but proceeded to ignore it.’”) 
(quoting Siegel v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 893 (2d Cir. 1985)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234, 240 (1st Cir. 1995) (“In order to 
demonstrate that the arbitrator both recognized and ignored the applicable law, ‘there must be some 
showing in the record, other than the result obtained, that the arbitrators knew the law and expressly 
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that requirement against the decision of the arbitrator to determine whether 
the arbitrator was aware of and ignored a clear application of the incorpo-
rated choice-of-law provision.67
By contrast, such limited judicial review is not available in the reli-
gious arbitration context, as parties are foreclosed from challenging a reli-
gious arbitration award under the manifest disregard of the law standard. 
Indeed, if a party sought vacatur of a religious arbitration award—claiming 
that the arbitrators ignored religious law in excluding evidence—the court 
would be constitutionally disabled from considering the petition for vaca-
tur. That court would have to determine what the religious law in question 
required before it could determine whether the arbitrators ignored that re-
quirement. And determining what religious law requires as a matter of evi-
dentiary law falls squarely under the “religious question doctrine”—that is, 
the constitutional prohibition against courts resolving claims that turn on 
disputes over religious doctrine or practice.68 Accordingly, a court could 
not determine whether or not religious law required excluding female tes-
timony; in turn, a court could not evaluate whether excluding specific fe-
male testimony constituted a manifest disregard of the law.69
A court’s inability to properly consider such a challenge to a religious 
arbitration award does not end the inquiry. From the vantage point of con-
stitutional law, there is no reason to conclude that the award should be en-
forced simply because a court cannot properly evaluate a claimed ground 
for vacatur. Indeed, as a purely abstract matter, we might conclude the 
precise opposite: because a court is constitutionally barred from engaging 
in the inquiry necessary to evaluate the claimed ground for vacatur, the 
arbitration award should be presumed invalid. 
But what could be true as a matter of constitutional law is foreclosed 
by the text of the FAA. According to the Act, “any party to the arbitration 
may apply . . . for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court 
must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or correct-
ed as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title.”70 As a result, unless the 
party seeking to invalidate the award can successfully demonstrate that an 
award should be vacated, the court must grant an order to confirm the 
award.71 In turn, the fact that a court is constitutionally disabled from eval-
 67.  See supra note 64. 
 68.  See supra note 25.  
 69.  See Lang v. Levi, 16 A. 3d 980, 989 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (noting that the “religious 
context” of the rabbinical arbitration award “further narrows the standard [of review]” so as “to make 
[the court’s] intervention nearly impossible”). 
 70.  Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. § 9 (West 2009 & Supp. 2014). 
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uating a particular motion to vacate an award means that the award must be 
confirmed.72
Taken together, these constitutional constraints and statutory require-
ments insulate religious arbitration awards from attack on procedural 
grounds where the claims would require resolution of religious questions.73
This type of insulation goes beyond the typical deference afforded other 
arbitration awards, short-circuiting the manifest disregard of the law in-
quiry before it even begins. The justification for this outcome lies in the 
generally held view that courts lack the institutional competence74 and con-
stitutional authority75 to resolve religious questions combined with the 
FAA’s insistence on judicial enforcement of arbitration awards absent any 
affirmative showing justifying a contrary outcome. In this way, the Consti-
tution requires that we treat religious law as a black box. And it thereby 
views religious law more like mysterious religious doctrine that is “beyond 
 72.  A somewhat analogous issue comes up in the context of claims for vacatur that are filed after 
the three-month statute of limitations has run on motion to vacate. See Federal Arbitration Act § 12 
(providing a three-month statute of limitations for providing notice of a motion to vacate an award). In 
contrast to a motion to vacate, a motion to confirm an award may be filed within one year of when the 
award was “made.” Id. § 9. A party who files a motion to confirm an award more than three months 
after the award was made thus avoids the possibility of the other party countering such a motion with a 
motion to vacate the award. See id. However, the fact that the losing party can no longer pursue a 
motion to vacate an award is not generally held to prevent the winning party from confirming the 
award. See, e.g., Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171, 172 (2d Cir. 1984). Of course, a losing 
party may bring a motion to vacate an award within the first three months after an award even if no 
motion to confirm the award is made. But absent doing so, the fact that a party moves to confirm an 
award after the three month period does not re-open the door for a party to make a motion to vacate an 
award.
 73.  This is not to say that religious arbitration awards are immune from attack on procedural 
grounds—only procedural challenges that implicate religious questions. Other procedural challenges 
can invalidate religious arbitration awards as they would any other arbitration award. See supra note 11. 
 74.  Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes between 
Religious Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 138 (2009) (arguing that the 
Establishment Clause instructs courts not to interfere in cases implicating religious doctrine or practice 
because such “claims would require courts to answer questions that the state is not competent to ad-
dress”); see also Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with 
Religious Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347, 391 (1984) (describing the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Watson v. Jones as standing for the proposition that “civil judges are incompetent to resolve 
questions concerning religious doctrine”). I have criticized these justifications for the religious question 
doctrine elsewhere. See Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U. L. REV. 493 (2013).  
 75.  See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-11, at 1231 (2d ed. 
1988) (noting that the prohibition against doctrinal entanglement in religious issues “[m]ore deeply, [] 
reflects the conviction that government—including judicial as well as the legislative and executive 
branches—must never take sides on religious matters,”); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. 
Sager, Does It Matter What Religion Is?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 807, 812 (2009) (“If government 
were to endorse some interpretations of religious doctrine at the expense of others, it would thereby 
favor some religious persons, sects, and groups over others.”); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and 
Civil Law: Using Secular Law to Assure Observance of Practices with Religious Significance, 71 S.
CAL. L. REV. 781, 804 (1998) (expressing the concern that judicial resolution of inter-denominational 
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the ken of mortals”76 and less like a legal regime susceptible to judicial 
analysis and inquiry. Put differently, this outcome exemplifies the way 
religious law is, at times, treated far more like religion than like law. 
II. THE CONUNDRUM OF RELIGIOUS LAW
The core conundrum of religious law is that U.S. law both gives it the 
status of law, but also prevents it from being interrogated like other forms 
of law. In so doing, religious law becomes a unique hybrid, inhabiting the 
space between law and religion. As explored in the previous section, this 
unique treatment significantly impacts how courts interface with religious 
tribunals—limiting the ability of courts to withhold confirmation of arbitra-
tion awards issued pursuant to religious arbitration proceedings and in ac-
cordance with religious law. In this way, our hypothetical raises the 
question of whether this hybrid treatment is the best way for U.S. law to 
conceptualize and treat religious law. Consider the following alternatives. 
One option is to simply close the courthouse doors completely to reli-
gious law. We might charitably attribute this motivation to the advocates of 
anti-Sharia legislation, although such advocates may be more directly mo-
tivated by constitutionally prohibited forms of anti-Muslim animus.77
While their impact is far from clear, the anti-Sharia laws generally prohibit 
courts from enforcing any decision that considers, relies upon, or is based 
upon religious law.78 Such provisions would ostensibly prevent courts from 
confirming religious arbitration awards and thereby avoid all the problems 
associated with reviewing procedural challenges to religious arbitration 
awards. 
However, such a dogmatic approach throws out the proverbial “baby 
with the bathwater,” especially given the vital role religious arbitration 
plays in the resolution of religious disputes. First, religious arbitration en-
hances the experience of religious freedom experienced within a wide 
range of religious communities by enabling co-religionists to resolve dis-
 76.  United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944). 
 77.  See, e.g., Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1128–29 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that Oklahoma’s 
Anti-Sharia Amendment discriminated among religions in violation of First Amendment); Awad v. 
Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1307 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (holding that Oklahoma’s Anti-Sharia Amend-
ment appeared to single out religion and was therefore not facially neutral).  
 78.  For a collection of recent legislative developments regarding anti-Sharia initiatives, see Bill 
Raftery, Bans on Court Use of Sharia/International Law: Introduced in Georgia UPDATED, GAVEL TO 
GAVEL (Feb. 5, 2014), http://gaveltogavel.us/2014/02/05/bans-on-court-use-of-shariainternational-law-
4th-year-in-a-row-mississippi-doesnt-advance-a-single-bill-introduced-in-georgia/. Alabama became 
the latest state to pass such a bill. See Liz Farmer, Alabama Joins Wave of States Banning Foreign 
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putes in accordance with shared religious precepts and values.79 Thus, to 
discard religious arbitration would strike a significant blow to the infra-
structure of religious freedom. And beyond enhancing this experience of 
religious freedom, religious arbitration plays an important gap-filling role, 
ensuring that co-religionists can resolve disputes that would otherwise be 
beyond the authority of courts to resolve.80 Indeed, the religious question 
doctrine prevents courts from adjudicating a wide range of religious dis-
putes that turn on religious doctrine and practice; these disputes include, for 
example, breach of contract cases turning on interpretation of religious 
terms81 and defamation claims turning on the truth or falsity of religious 
statements.82 Religious arbitration provides the only forum for resolving 
many of these claims; parties can submit these disputes to arbitration and 
then the arbitrators’ award can be confirmed in court, giving it the power of 
an enforceable judgment. Without religious arbitration, these claims would 
go unresolved, as courts would have to dismiss such cases because of the 
religious question doctrine. In sum, responding to the conundrum of reli-
gious law by casting religious law out of the courthouse causes far more 
problems than it solves. 
A second option is to embrace the constitutionally mandated insula-
tion of religious arbitration awards. There is much to commend with this 
approach, which fits with the growing “religious institutionalism” litera-
ture.83 On such an account, courts should not second-guess the decisions of 
religious institutions; rather religious institutions are best understood as 
standing beyond the jurisdiction of the state, retaining the autonomy to 
make decisions and resolve disputes in accordance with their religious 
rules, doctrine, and practices.84 Typically, claims of religious institutional 
 79.  Helfand, supra note 28, at 1243–52. 
 80.  For a discussion of religion’s gap-filling function, see Helfand, supra note 74, at 509.  
 81.  See, e.g., Sieger v. Sieger, 747 N.Y.S.2d 102 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); Zummo v. Zummo, 574 
A.2d 1130, 1146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
 82.  See, e.g., Klagsbrun v. Va’ad Harabonim of Greater Monsey, 53 F. Supp. 2d 732 (D. N.J. 
1999); Farley v. Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, 821 F. Supp. 1286, 1289 (D. Minn. 1993); 
Goodman v. Temple Shir Ami, Inc., 712 So. 2d 775 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Downs v. Roman 
Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 683 A.2d 808, 813 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996); Abdelhak v. Jewish 
Press Inc., 985 A.2d 197 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009). 
 83.  Prominent examples of this approach include Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? 
Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 288 (2008); 
Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 43 HARV. CIVIL 
RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES L. REV. 79, 87 (2009); Steven D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of 
the Church, in UNIV. OF SAN DIEGO LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH SERIES 2011 (Research Paper No. 11-
061, Aug. 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1911412.  
 84.  Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power,
84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 55 (1998) (“If the law is to order two entities (‘separation of church and state’), the 
law must first recognize the existence of both entities. The juridical consequence is that the status of 
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autonomy require courts to abstain from any form of intervention in reli-
gious disputes.85 Applying this approach in the context of religious arbitra-
tion would require courts not to simply abstain from the dispute’s 
resolution, but to enforce the award under the rubric of arbitration without 
interrogating the internal decision-making process of the arbitration tribu-
nal. Still, a strong commitment to institutional autonomy might encourage 
judicial avoidance of religious questions generally and religious procedural 
challenges to arbitration awards specifically. Thus, the fact that current 
doctrine requires courts to confirm a religious arbitration award—
notwithstanding the unaddressed claim for vacatur on religious procedural 
grounds—might be seen as a positive outcome, because it represents the 
further entrenchment of religious institutional autonomy by enforcing the 
decisions of religious arbitrators without second-guessing the religious 
decision-making process. 
The challenge, however, with providing such extraordinary insulation 
of religious arbitration awards is that it opens the door for some significant 
abuse of the arbitral process. Parties incorporate religious choice-of-law 
provisions into their agreements in order to ensure that both the substance 
and process of the arbitration conforms to a mutually shared sense of reli-
gious obligation and commitment.86 Without any judicial oversight over 
claims of religious procedural misconduct, there is no way to ensure that 
the parties will get what they bargained for. Indeed, the lack of oversight 
religious entities may operate unhindered by government in accordance with their own understanding of 
divine origin and mission.”); Paul Horwitz, Act III of the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 156, 161–62 (2011) (“[C]ourts, and the state itself, are simply not authorized to intervene in 
life at the heart of churches. At a deep level, these questions lie beyond the reach of the state altogether. 
The two kingdoms of temporal and spiritual authority, of church and state, constitute two separate 
sovereigns.”); Horwitz, supra note 83, at 114 (concluding that under “a sphere sovereignty approach to 
religious entities,” religious institutions “would coexist alongside the state . . . serving a vital role in 
furthering self-fulfillment, the development of a religious community, and the development of public 
discourse.”); Gregory A. Kalscheur, Civil Procedure and the Establishment Clause: Exploring the 
Ministerial Exception, Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the Church, 17 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 43, 91–96 (2008) (describing how conceptualizing the ministerial exception as jurisdic-
tional reaffirms the “penultimacy of the state”); Mark DeWolfe Howe, Foreword: Political Theory and 
the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91, 94 (1953) (interpreting the Supreme Court’s church proper-
ty cases and concluding that “the Court may have been persuaded that a church must enjoy prerogatives 
of sovereignty which are not to be conceded to other social groups.”). 
 85.  This approach has been characterized by Kent Greenawalt as the “hands off” approach to 
religious disputes. See Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Reli-
gious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843 (1998); see also Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach 
to Religious Doctrine: What Are We Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 837 (2009); Samu-
el J. Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Questions of Religious Practice 
and Belief, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 85, 87–88 (1997); Andrew Koppelman, The Troublesome Religious 
Roots of Religious Neutrality, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 865, 867 (2009); Samuel J. Levine, The Su-
preme Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: An Introduction, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
793, 794 (2009).  
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might actually worry parties who seek religious arbitration, making it a less 
attractive alternative, because claims that the arbitrator ignored certain 
religious procedural and evidentiary rules may be left unaddressed. And 
such festering concerns could eat away at the very infrastructure of reli-
gious freedom that religious arbitration is intended to provide. 
There remains a third alternative. Instead of unequivocally rejecting or 
embracing religious law, we might begin the process of de-mystifying reli-
gious law. As I have argued elsewhere,87 we might reimagine the role of 
courts in the resolution of disputes that turn on religious doctrine or prac-
tice. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s early approach to religious disputes au-
thorized courts to address claims that a religious institution failed to adhere 
to its internal religious rules in its own decision-making process.88 In so 
doing, courts were able to ensure that the decisions of religious institutions 
were subject to the institution’s own internal religious procedural safe-
guards.89 Adopting such an approach in the context of arbitration would 
enable courts to vacate awards predicated on a religious arbitration tribu-
nal’s willful failure to apply religious procedural and evidentiary rules. 
Of course, this does not mean that courts should have free rein to in-
ject themselves into religious arbitration proceedings, undermining the 
ability of religious tribunals to provide final and enforceable judgments in 
accordance with the shared expectations of the parties. Indeed, even under 
the manifest disregard of the law standard, arbitrators are afforded extreme-
ly wide deference to the point where marshaling a successful challenge to 
the award on manifest disregard grounds seems extremely unlikely.90 Ac-
cordingly, in cases where there is some dispute as to what the religious 
 87.  See generally Helfand, supra note 74; see also Michael A. Helfand, Religion’s Footnote 
Four: Church Autonomy as Arbitration, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1891 (2013). 
 88.  The most prominent Supreme Court case expressing this view was Gonzalez v. Roman Catho-
lic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 17 (1929), where the court held that the decisions of “the proper 
church tribunals” would be deemed “conclusive” only in the absence of “fraud, collusion, or arbitrari-
ness.” This standard was widely adopted by lower courts in the early half of the 20th century. See Note, 
Judicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes—Some Constitutional Considerations, 74 YALE L.J. 
1113, 1118, 1122 (1965) (further explaining that “courts began to demand from the church tribunals 
adherence to some rudimentary notions of fairness” such that they “would only defer to a church tribu-
nal which had followed its own procedural rules.”); see also Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. 131, 140 
(1872) (holding that the majority of a congregational church is considered to represent the church “if 
they adhere to the organization and the doctrines”); Brundage v. Deardorf, 55 F. 839, 847–48 (C.C.N.D. 
Ohio 1893) (“Certainly, the effect of Watson v. Jones cannot be extended beyond the principle that a 
bona fide decision of the fundamental law of the church must be recognized as conclusive by civil 
courts. Clearly, it was not the intention of the court to recognize as legitimate the revolutionary action 
of a majority of a supreme judicatory, in fraud of the rights of a minority seeking to maintain the integ-
rity of the original compact.”). For my extended discussion of this point, see Helfand, supra note 74, at 
519–41.  
 89.  Id.





      01/14/2015   15:25:42
35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 88 Side A      01/14/2015   15:25:42
P06 - HELFAND (WITH SMALL CHANGES).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2015 9:36 AM
2015] BETWEEN LAW AND RELIGION 161 
procedural rules require, religious arbitration awards are already insulated 
from vacatur based on standard rules of arbitration law; that is, any arbitra-
tion award—religious or secular—will not be vacated on account of an 
error of law. But de-mystifying religious law in this context would ensure 
that courts retain the ability to step in and uphold religious procedural rules 
where religious tribunals intentionally ignore clear and definite religious 
procedural requirements. Treating religious law like any other law provides 
co-religionists with an important mechanism to avoid an arbitrator’s blatant 
disregard of the religious law incorporated into the arbitration agreement. 
In this way, seeing religious law as more like law than religion can help 
protect the institutional infrastructure that makes religious freedom possi-
ble.
CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the inherent hybridity of religious law as a 
category somewhere between law and religion. To do so, the Article pre-
sented a case study, which exemplifies the hybrid status of religious law: 
procedural challenges to religious arbitration awards. When courts consider 
such challenges, they find themselves vacillating between these two cate-
gories—at times treating religious law as law while at other times treating 
religious law as religion. This inherent tension in the conceptualization of 
religious law has important practical implications. The combined impact of 
current arbitration and constitutional doctrine insulates religious law from 
certain forms of judicial review. Religious law can be given legal effect 
when incorporated into a contract between two parties, but courts are con-
stitutionally prohibited from ensuring that the application of this mutually 
selected body of law is true to the underlying religious doctrine. 
Recognizing the unique status of religious law enables us to question 
whether the current state of affairs is the preferred framework for interac-
tion between secular and religious law. For some, this unique status is 
cause for concern, because it could justify banning religious law altogether 
from the courthouse. For others, the insulation of religious law from certain 
forms of judicial review is an outcome to be celebrated, as it further pro-
vides religious institutions with constitutionally mandated autonomy, free 
from government interference. But there remains a third option for engag-
ing religious law—one that both embraces the applicability of religious law 
in U.S. courts, and seeks to de-mystify religious law by treating it more like 
law than religion. Treating religious law more like law would enable 
courts, for example, to ensure that arbitrators—tasked by parties to apply 
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gious rules in issuing awards. It would allow courts to serve as a backstop 
for intentionally misguided application of religious procedural rules and 
safeguards, and in so doing, would ensure that religious arbitration can 
serve as part of the religious institutional infrastructure that makes religious 
freedom possible. 
